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Book Reviews 
THE PEOPLE'S FOREST AND LEVY'S 
TREES: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS. By Leonard W. 
Levy.1 New Haven, Cf: Yale University Press. 1999. Pp. 
xii, 306. Hardcover, $30.00. 
Brian C. Kalr 
As part of my Cold War era public-school education, I was 
taught that the Soviet bill of rights guaranteed freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, and all manner of rights held dear 
by Americans.3 But, my teachers said, the Soviet bill of rights 
was just lies on paper; the American version was a real Bill of 
Rights. 
All true, of course. But why? What makes a bill of rights a 
source of inspiration and freedom rather than just a source of 
irony? One reason is tradition: to have a future of rights, a na-
tion must have a history of rights or, at least, a history of striving 
toward them. 
I. Mellon Professor Emeritus, Claremont Graduate School; Distinguished Scholar 
in Residence, Southern Oregon State College. 
2. Assistant Professor-Designate, Michigan State University-Detroit College of 
Law. Associate, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C. 
3. See, e.g., Boris Topomin, The New Constitution of the USSR art. 50 at 254 (Pro-
gress Publishers, 1980) ("(C)itizens of the USSR arc guaranteed freedom of speech, of 
the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations."); id. art. 52 
at 254 ("Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to 
profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheistic 
propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited."); id. 
art. 56 at 255 ("The privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversa-
tions, and telegraphic communications is protected by law."). 
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A second reason is democracy. What the United States had, 
and the Soviets lacked, was true popular sovereignty. Ameri-
cans can believe in their Bill of Rights because it is their Bill of 
Rights. If one part of the government violates the rights of the 
People, the People can use another part of the government to 
obtain justice. Failing that, the People can mobilize and select a 
new government. The Soviets? No such luck, no matter what 
their Constitution said. 
Origins of the Bill of Rights, Leonard Levy's thirty-sixth 
book, presents a stirring account of the first reason, the history 
and tradition of specific rights in pre-Bill-of-Rights America. 
But, Levy largely misses the second reason; he gives no sense of 
how deeply important popular sovereignty is to the Bill of Rights 
as a whole, both at its origins and in the present day. 
Section I of this review describes and discusses Levy's able 
chronicle of the history and traditions of the Bill of Rights. First, 
as suggested by the book's title, Levy recounts the individual his-
tories of the rights in the Constitution and Bill of Rights,4 from 
their early English origins through their use in the colonies and 
the early years of statehood. Levy also offers the interesting and 
ironic political story of the Bill's birth, showing how the Bill was 
created and promoted by the Federalists (who had originally op-
posed the entire enterprise) and was passed over the resistance 
of the Anti-Federalists (who had clamored for the Bill's creation 
in the first place). These two subjects in Origins are well re-
searched and interesting, if not particularly groundbreaking. 
Above all, they are comforting, offering the iconic image of 
James Madison, persisting tirelessly until our most beloved 
rights and freedoms were etched into our national consciousness 
(and onto a plaque at my old school). 
By contrast, Levy's third subject- the meaning of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole-is decidedly un-comforting. It is here that he 
shortchanges the notion of popular sovereignty that is so central 
to the Bill. Levy, never one to mince words, says that the crea-
tors and supporters of the Constitution "botch[ed) constitutional 
theory" by omitting a bill of rights and then gave reasons for 
their continued opposition to a bill that were "patently absurd" 
4. To be precise, Levy covers two rights not in the Bill (concerning habeas corpus 
and bills of attainder), and discusses only about half of the provisions that arc in the Bill, 
leaving out provisions both vestigial (e.g., the Third Amendment's limitation on quar-
tering troops) and significant (e.g., the Fifth Amendment's Takings Gause, the Tenth 
Amendment, and several more). 
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and disingenuous. (pp. 23, 30) Section II of this review is de-
voted to defending the Federalists' words and ideas rather than 
blithely reading them out of the Bill. The Federalists' com-
ments, far from being doltish and worthless, make it clear that 
the Bill was about limiting government through popular sover-
eignty. Levy's notion of the Bill of Rights as empowering the 
courts to protect personal spheres of individual liberty may ring 
true in 1999, but it is incomplete and anachronistic in a book on 
the origins of the Bill of Rights. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
General readers should feel free to judge this book by its 
cover and enjoy it. The bulk of Origins comprises Levy's rousing 
accounts of the histories of various rights, starting with their 
early English origins and describing their evolution in America 
up through the post-Revolutionary period. In most cases, Levy 
also explains how each particular right found its way into the 
Constitution. Nothing to set the scholarly world afire, to be sure, 
but Levy does not pretend otherwise: six of the twelve chapters 
in Origins are taken, essentially verbatim, fr<?m his 1988 book 
Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution.' But after a life-
time of scholarship on constitutional liberty, characterized by 
exhaustive primary-source research, Levy is both uniquely quali-
fied and uniquely entitled to write a simple, compelling narrative 
of the history of some of our favorite rights.6 
A. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHTS 
With drama and flair, Levy recounts the histories of habeas 
corpus, bills of attainder, church establishment, the free press, 
the right to bear arms, general warrants, double jeopardy, self-
incrimination, jury indictment and trial, and the right against 
cruel, unusual, and excessive punishment. 
5. Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constillltion (MacMillan, 
1988) ("Original Intent"). 
6. There arc no footnotes or endnotes in the entire book, reinforcing that Origins 
is not breaking any new ground, but enhancing the book's function as an accessible 
primer on the history of liberty, for a general audience. Those unwilling to give Levy the 
benefit of the doubt as to his sources can find in most cases a corresponding (identical) 
passage in Original Intent (cited in note 5). 
Because Origins takes this form, this review concentrates on analyzing Levy's 
broader themes rather than quibbling with his individual historical accounts. 
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As Professor Jed Rubenfeld has cogently observed, most of 
these rights were constructed in response to specific episodes in 
which the proto-right was violated.7 Levy tells us about the epi-
sodes for each-wrongs committed sometimes by the British, 
sometimes by a colonial government, and sometimes by both. In 
doing so, he offers historical insights about these rights that are 
either missing from the popular discourse on rights or that could 
bear emphasis. Rather than condense all of Levy's stories here 
(he tells the gory details better anyway), this subsection will dis-
cuss two of Levy's general themes. 
First, Levy explains that the Framers of the Bill of Rights 
were deeply inspired by the experience of English Whigs op-
posing the Stuart Kings in the 17th century. (p. 4) Led by Lord 
Coke and others, the Whigs invented a history of liberty from 
malleable sources such as Magna Carta. (p. 152) America, Levy 
posits, provided fertile soil for the Whigs' novel notions of free-
dom to grow; it was encumbered neither by the remnants of feu-
dalism nor by the rigidities and divisions caused by an estab-
lished church. (p. 2) The Americans continued the Whig 
tradition of finding rights in ancient, vague, foundational docu-
ments; constructing inflated or fictional histories of the right's 
exercise; and finally declaring the right in formal legal terms. 
This theme is developed most thoroughly in Levy's chapter on 
the Fourth Amendment, an impressive catalog of the evolution 
of doctrine and the corresponding (if lagging) evolution of prac-
tice in the realm of searches, seizures, and general warrants. ( ch. 
7) In the end, under the Fourth Amendment, warrants had to be 
specific and rest on an oath; the federal government was allowed 
to search and seize, so long as it did so "reasonably." 
Second, and relatedly, Levy notes that the colonial and state 
governments continued another English tradition: routinely 
violating the rights they supposedly held dear. Once again, this 
theme pervades the book, but one chapter, on habeas corpus, 
stands out most vividly. (ch. 2) Levy describes in detail how 
colonial legislators, protective of their status and unencumbered 
by a strong independent judiciary, flouted the Great Writ by or-
dering jailers to ignore it and keep political prisoners locked up. 
(pp. 56-63) "The writ was impotent," Levy says, "when con-
fronted by an irate legislature." (p. 61) Although habeas corpus 
was better respected by the time of the 1787 Convention, the 
7. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale L.J. 1119 
(1995). 
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principal point of debate there regarding the Writ was the extent 
to which it could be suspended. (pp. 65-66) A safeguard, to be 
sure, but a visibly limited one. 
Rights formed of vague texts and dubious history, evolving 
slowly from disrespect to increasing acceptance, but even in the 
end enshrined in a limited form-it is this fuzziness that makes 
Origins so compelling. The fragile origins of our most treasured 
rights are both fascinating to behold and critically important to 
study. 
B. ORIGINS OF THE BILL 
Levy is concerned not just with the origins of the Rights, but 
with the origins of the Bill as well. Here too, he tells a story 
worth reading; one that, if not wholly original, is lively and pro-
vocative. Levy shows how the Bill of Rights was produced by an 
apathetic Congress, spurred into action only by the persistence 
of James Madison, who was himself driven in large part by sly 
political motives. 
1. "Confounding the Anties" 
Why, Levy asks, did the Anti-Federalists oppose Madison's 
efforts to add a bill of rights to the Constitution, when previously 
they had said that the lack of a bill of rights was the Constitu-
tion's principal flaw? The answer is politics. Constitutional poli-
tics, to be sure, but politics nonetheless. 
It is easy enough to forget 210 years later, but in early 1789 
it was not at all clear that the American constitutional system 
would survive. Two states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, 
still refused to ratify the Constitution. Some states had ratified 
only because of the promise that a bill of rights would be added. 
(pp. 31-32) Four states, including Virginia and New York, called 
for a second convention, primarily to prune back important fed-
eral powers such as the broad authority to tax. (p. 34) 
Given the substantial support for their position, the Anti-
Federalists had no desire to make the Constitution more palat-
able by adding a bill of rights to it. (p. 34) Thus, they either fa-
vored adding amendments more stringent than those Madison 
proposed, or they opposed the Bill outright. (p. 35) They feared 
(correctly) that passing Madison's bill would deflate the momen-
tum gathering behind a second constitutional convention, and so 
they denigrated Madison's efforts. (pp. 34-35) As Aedanus 
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Burke, a sour-grapes Anti-Federalist congressman, colorfully put 
it, Madison's proposals were "not those solid and substantial 
amendments which the people expect; they are little better than 
whip-syallabub, frothy and full of wind .... [I]t will be better to 
drop the subject now, and proceed to the organization of the 
Government." (p. 39) 
Madison too realized that his bill would make the Constitu-
tion more acceptable to the public and would take the wind out 
of Anti-Federalist sails, thereby preventing a second convention 
and saving the Federalists' labors from the scrap heap. (p. 34) 
What is surprising is that Madison's partisans (one of whom 
merrily reported to Madison that the proposed bill of rights had 
"confounded the Anties exceedingly") were not particularly en-
thusiastic to pass a bill of rights either. (pp. 36-37) In part, the 
Federalists had more important business to attend to: setting up 
a federal government from scratch was no small task. (p. 37) 
Other Federalists felt that it would be helpful to write a bill of 
rights later, with the benefit of experience under the new system. 
(p. 36) 
As a result, Madison's proposed bill of rights stirred little 
support. (p. 37) Six weeks after the introduction, with the pro-
posed bill gathering dust, Madison begged the House to consider 
it. (p. 37) Rather than debate the bill, the House assigned it to a 
special committee and then tabled the committee's report. (p. 
37) Later, though, perhaps to pacify Madison, the House de-
bated, amended, and approved the bill. (pp. 37-38) The Senate 
soon followed suit and after a swift conference committee in 
September 1789, the Bill of Rights was apl'roved in its final form 
and submitted to the states for ratification.8 (p. 40) 
Even then ambivalence reigned. Ten states (including new-
comer Vermont) quickly ratified the bulk of the Bill, but three 
states just as quickly rejected it.9 (pp. 40-41) This left Virginia as 
the deciding state. (p. 41) Finally, after two years of opposition 
8. Origins features a terrific Appendix, which includes: a chart detailing the slates' 
proposals for rights to be included in the Bill; the English and Virginia Bills of Rights; 
Madison's proposed Bill; and the Bill's contents after approval by the House Committee, 
the House, and the Senate. Viewing Madison's proposal is instructive in ways too nu-
merous to mention here. One example is the striking way in which Madison juxtaposes 
ringing declarations of rights with structural tinkering. As this review argues, it is no ac-
cident that both types of proposals were part of the same project. In any case, anyone 
reading the book should be sure to read Madison's proposal in full. 
9. The Bill passed by Congress contained two additional amendments, one on 
congressional apportionment that never passed, (pp. 40, 291) and one on congressional 
pay raises that passed 203 years later. (pp. 40, 291) See U.S. Const., Amend. XXVII. 
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and procrastination, Virginia approved the Bill m December 
1791, making it law. (pp. 41-43) 
2. Federalist Opposition 
Federalists offered several excuses for leaving a bill of rights 
out of the Constitution. When Elbridge Gerry and George Ma-
son suggested the idea at the Convention, the idea was "passed 
off in a short conversation." (p. 13) The Convention did, how-
ever, add a handful of specific rights to the Constitution, includ-
ing the ban on religious tests for office, and the prohibitions on 
passing ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing 
contracts. The Framers, Levy tells us (in an all-too-brief passage 
he later seems to forget), were less interested in enumerating 
natural rights than they were in providing political means for se-
curing those rights. (p. 19) 
When the proposed Constitution came under fire for its lack 
of a bill of rights. The Federalists responded that the omission 
was of no moment. The Constitution, they said, gave the federal 
government no power to infringe the basic rights guaranteed by 
the states. (pp. 20-21) To append a bill of rights would be dan-
gerous, they added, because that would imply that any rights not 
listed were surrendered. (p. 21) Conversely, they contended, a 
bill of rights would suggest that the federal government had the 
power to violate these rights but for the bill, leading people to 
ignore the Constitution's strictly limited enumeration of federal 
power. (pp. 20-21) 
As discussed in the next section, Levy believes that the Fed-
eralists simply dropped the ball, talking themselves into an anti-
bill position that was not just untenable, but illogical and inde-
fensible as well. (p. 23) To Levy, if I may put words into his 
mouth, the Federalist Framers were like used-car salesmen, 
telling skeptical customers: "I'll admit that this car has no 
brakes, but you don't really need them. Besides, if you had 
brakes you'd probably drive too fast." Bowing to political real-
ity, Levy concludes, the Federalists eventually dropped the cha-
rade and supported Madison's Bill. (p. 43) 
It is difficult to reconcile the Federalist ambivalence toward 
the Bill with the obvious political benefits of "confounding the 
Anties." Perhaps the Federalists simply were embarrassed by 
their need to backtrack. Levy shows that Madison could not af-
ford such pride. Madison's opposition to a bill of rights at the 
Virginia ratifying convention had cost him vital political support 
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in the state legislature, which rejected him in favor of two Anti-
Federalists for the U.S. Senate. (p. 32) Indeed, Madison faced a 
"tough contest" even to get elected to the U.S. House. (p. 32) 
Once there, he felt duty bound to honor the promise he made to 
the Virginia ratifying convention to propose a bill. (p. 34) 
Leaving aside Levy's dismissive treatment of the Federal-
ists' arguments against a Bill, his portrait of the political climate 
attending the proposal and passage of the Bill of Rights is in-
structive. As with the history of the Rights, his point about the 
history of the Bill-that it was fueled by partisan politics and 
passed amid apathy- is a meaningful one to bear in mind, for 
lawyers and citizens alike. We could use some apathy and parti-
san politics like that today. 
II. THE MEANING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
On its face, the Bill of Rights ensured that the federal gov-
ernment did not abuse or exceed its delegated powers. The most 
important mechanisms for ensuring these limits were structural 
and majoritarian, and the Bill also served to declare first princi-
ples, educating the People who drove this majoritarian process. 
The People and the politicians they elected all had a role, and 
duty, as interpreters and enforcers of constitutional rights. 10 The 
Bill was not supposed to be just fodder for judges. Admittedly, 
however, the meaning of the Bill has changed over the centu-
ries.11 The federal government has burst through the constraints 
on its powers, rendering obsolete the concept of protecting rights 
simply by limiting government power. Simultaneously, though, 
the government has become seen as a guarantor of rights as 
much as a potential threat to them. Rights that were political 
and majoritarian in scope are now viewed as personal and indi-
vidualistic. The structural and educative mechanisms of days 
10. Indeed, some of the greatest constitutional debates of the early Republic took 
place amongst and between the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the states. 
In the pantheon of constitutional debaters of the day, one must include not only John 
Marshall and Joseph Story but such non-judges as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun. 
I I. Professor Akhil Amar has argued convincingly that the principal source of 
change in the meaning of the Bill of Rights has been the prismatic effect of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction (Yale U. Press, 1998). While other amendments to the Constitution have 
widened the franchise (changing who "the People" are) or tinkered with the structure of 
the government, the Civil War Amendments (including the Fourteenth) represent the 
only addition to the Bill of Rights' "enumeration." 
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past have been supplanted by a near total reliance on federal 
courts as the arbiters of rights, their extent, and their meaning. 
This newer, court-centered notion of American constitu-
tional rights pervades Levy's vision of the Bill, while older, struc-
tural/majoritarian concepts of rights are mostly missing from 
Origins. This is a significant omission, given that Levy purports 
to be writing about the origins of the Bill of Rights and not their 
subsequent evolution. But Levy's anachronistic view sacrifices 
more than just lessons of history; it also overlooks the potential 
lessons-real and relevant-that the Bill's original structure of-
fers us today. This section tries to resuscitate these lessons de-
spite Levy's attempt to discard them. 
A. QUITE UN-PREPOSTEROUS 
Levy never really asks what the Bill means as a whole, apart 
from its individual components. Levy says only that the Bill "en-
shrine[ s] personal liberties," the protection of which is essen-
tially the government's raison d'etre. (pp. 43, 260) An apt de-
scription of what the Bill and Constitution mean today, perhaps. 
The times have changed, the contexts of the rights have changed, 
but to Levy the Bill of Rights represented the same thing in 1791 
that it does now: a collection of spheres of personal liberty to be 
protected by the federal courts. 
1. Taking The States At Their Word 
If this is what the Bill was about, then why did so many 
states, clamoring for a bill of rights at the federal level, lack bills 
of rights themselves? And of those that had a bill, why did so 
many omit basic rights such as freedom of speech? Confronted 
with this question, Levy throws up his hands. He reports that 
the record on state bills of rights is "inexplicable except in terms 
of shoddy craftsmanship" that "verged on ineptness." (pp. 11, 
186) To Levy, the process of selection was "baffling," and there 
is "no reasoned explanation" as to why only two states' constitu-
tions protected freedom of speech; only one protected against 
double jeopardy; only five forbade general warrants; and so on. 
(pp. 64, 186) 
But there are rational explanations. State bills of rights 
functioned as declaratory provisions as much as, if not more 
than, they served as positive-law provisions. That is, they re-
minded the People which rights were most important. Mean-
while, the protection of these rights came not just from the 
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"parchment barriers" that declared them, but also from the 
popular sovereignty underlying the system. If the government 
violated a right, whether the right was enshrined as positive law 
or was textually invisible, the People-acting as voters, jurors, or 
armed and "out of doors" -could overrule it. Levy himself pro-
vides the stark example of the colonial Boston throngs who pre-
vented execution of general warrants (not yet illegal in a posi-
tivist sense) by British customs agents. (p. 159) Given these 
popular-sovereignty methods of enforcement, it may not have 
been nearly as important for a bill of rights to be complete, or 
indeed to be written at all. 
2. Taking The Federalists At Their Word 
Can we glean any insight as to what the Bill of Rights meant 
from the anti-bill comments of the Federalists? Levy throws up 
his hands again, in a passage worth quoting at length: 
That the Framers of the Constitution actually believed their 
own arguments to justify the omission of a bill of rights is dif-
ficult to credit. Some of the points they made were patently 
absurd, like the insistence that the inclusion of a bill of rights 
would be dangerous, and on historical grounds, unsuitable. 
The last point most commonly turned up in the claim that bills 
of rights were appropriate in England but not in America. 
[The English precedent] had "no application to constitu-
tions ... founded upon the power of the people" who surren-
dered nothing and retained everything. (p. 23, quoting The 
Federalist No. 84) 
Despite Levy's harsh view, the Federalist explanation for the 
omission of a bill of rights seems sincere. In large part this is be-
cause the explanation is echoed in the final contents of the Bill 
itself.12 The passage quoted above is a fine example; its language 
is echoed in the Ninth Amendment, as discussed below. 
In sum, Levy gives up too quickly, and in doing so he also 
gives up the chance to treat the Bill as meaning more than the 
sum of its parts. Indeed, viewed as a whole, and in light of the 
explanations that Levy so blithely casts away, it is apparent that 
12. Another reason to conclude that the Federalists were sincere is that they used 
the same explanation for excluding a bill during their closed debates at the Convention, 
long before the Anti-Federalist uproar demanded a politic response. (p. 13) At that 
time, the explanation for omitting a bill satisfied not only the signers but also the ~em­
bers of the Convention who refused to sign; none of them gave the absence of a blil of 
rights as a reason for their dissent. (p. 104) 
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the Bill of Rights meant to enshrine and protect the larger sys-
tem of popular sovereignty-majoritarian rule vindicated 
through structural political mechanisms, fueled by an informed 
citizenry agitating for its rights. "Standing up" could be done on 
a soap box, through a ballot box, in the jury box, and, if neces-
sary, with a cartridge box. The Bill of Rights served to fuel this 
process by educating the citizenry, declaring rights in ringing and 
legitimated terms. Using a bill of rights as a source of defensive 
positive law before a judge was but one resort among many.13 
B. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POLITICAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS 
The quote from The Federalist No. 84 recited above-that a 
bill of rights was not needed in a system based on the sover-
eignty of a People who retained their rights and powers-illumi-
nates the importance of these myriad popular-sovereignty struc-
tural mechanisms. 
Under the unamended Constitution, all of the federal gov-
ernment's power was controlled ultimately by the People, and 
each facet of the People's sovereignty gave them a voice in de-
termining which government actions were permissible in light of 
the rights they retained. If the People's senators, representa-
tives, or president determined that a law was inappropriate, 
those elected officials would not let the law go forward; if they 
did so anyway and the People disagreed, the People could speak 
up through state governments or "out of doors" and could select 
different federal leaders the next chance they had. In the mean-
time, jurors could interpret the law or just nullify it. Thus, the 
Constitution ensured through multiple structural redundancies 
that the People would have several opportunities to quell gov-
ernment action, and that their rights would not be blotted out by 
one unrepresentative and overweening part of the government. 
This Federalist vision of the constitutional government was 
not, as Levy would have it, simply a disingenuous excuse for a 
13. Of course, enumerating rights made it much easier to enforce them in court. 
This was a reason given for writing some rights into the Constitution, even though they 
were so obvious that some felt they need not be written down at all. See, e.g., Max Far-
rand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 375-76 (Yale U. Press, 
1911) (discussion of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder). As discussed below, my 
view is that this also constitutes the principal difference between enumerated rights and 
the unenumerated rights mentioned in the Ninth Amendment-the latter depended 
wholly on popular and political enforcement, while the former could rely on positive-law 
judicial protection as well. 
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simple political error of omitting a bill of rights. The Federalists 
believed that a republican government of limited, enumerated, 
and separated powers would not threaten liberty.14 For their 
part, the Anti-Federalists disagreed, or at least believed that the 
Constitution did not provide such a government. Is Levy's im-
plication correct that, in conceding the bill of rights point, the 
Federalists effectively abandoned their political theories in favor 
of the Anti-Federalists'? (p. 43) 
It seems unlikely. Taking seriously Federalist claims that a 
bill of rights was needless and dangerous, it seems improbable 
that the Federalists would have destroyed their Constitution in 
order to save it. More likely, the Bill of Rights was written and 
structured to prevent the dangers and maintain the Federalist vi-
sion of the Constitution, even while amending it. There is sub-
stantial evidence to support this view, evidence that tells us quite 
clearly what the Bill of Rights meant. 
1. The Preamble 
Let's start at the start. The Bill of Rights-the actual piece 
of paper-has a preamble that is typically not reproduced in 
copies of the Constitution. But it is there nonetheless, on the 
cover of Levy's book among other places, and it states quite 
clearly what the Bill is supposed to do. It reads as follows: 
The conventions of a number of the States having at the time 
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order 
to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further 
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added, and as ex-
tending the ground of public confidence in the government will 
best insure the beneficent ends of its institution, be it re-
solved .... 15 
Compare this to the preamble of, say, the Virginia Bill of Rights: 
A Declaration of Rights made by the representatives of the 
good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free Conven-
tion; which rights do pertain to them, and their posterity, as 
the basis and foundation of government. (p. 272) 
Read in this context, the federal Bill of Rights can be seen for 
what it is: a clarification of the Constitution to prevent miscon-
14. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at 542 
(U. of North Carolina Press, 1969). 
I 5. See, e.g., Robert Famighetti, et al., eds., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 
535 (World Almanac Books, 1999) (emphasis added). 
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struction; a statement of principles ("declaratory" ones pre-
sumably pre-existing the Bill) for limiting the powers of govern-
ment and boosting confidence in it. Structure and popular sov-
ereignty. Missing from the preamble (and not missing from the 
Virginia Bil9 is a sense of a positivist codification of the rights of 
individuals.1 
2. The Bill 
The preamble is, appropriately, just the beginning. In his 
recent book on the Bill of Rights, Professor Akhil Amar shows 
how, read as a whole, the entire Bill reinforces the vitality of the 
structural mechanisms discussed in this review. For the popular-
sovereignty method of protecting rights to work most effectively, 
the people need to have the right to assemble, petition, speak, 
publish, keep a gun, and appeal to a jury. At the same time, a 
self-dealing federal government must not be able to quash ma-
joritarian voices by suppressing debate and assembly, confiscat-
ing weapons, quartering troops, executing heavy handed 
searches and seizures using general warrants, confiscating prop-
erty, utilizing vindictive and unfair prosecutions and trials, or 
meting out excessive punishments.17 These structural mecha-
nisms were designed to ensure that the Federalist vision of a 
limited government and a sovereign People would survive, and 
that the rights and ideals reflected in the discourse of the day 
could be vindicated. 
3. Ninth Amendment 
A final source for understanding the meaning of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole-and one to which Levy gives a fair amount of 
attention-is the Ninth Amendment. (ch. 12) The Ninth 
Amendment declares that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people."18 No state proposed an ana-
logue to the Ninth Amendment; it was a second-order 
amendment, required only in the shadow of the eight that pre-
ceded it, and thus it sheds light on the meaning of those eight 
16. To be sure, such an individualistic reading of the Bill of Rights did emerge, but 
not for several generations after the Founding, after the Bill had been transformed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied against the states. Though the language of the Bill 
supports these newer uses as well, that should not obscure the fact that the Bill meant 
something different at its origins. 
17. See generally Amar, The Bill of Rights, ch. 1·6 (cited in note 11). 
18. U.S. Const., Amend. IX. 
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provisions.19 The Ninth Amendment makes it clearer that the 
Bill of Rights is declaratory and educative, not just a source of 
positive law, and that the Bill was about popular sovereignty and 
a carefully wrought structure of limited government. 
The key to understanding the Ninth Amendment is in the 
arguments that the Federalists made (and that Levy discards) 
against having a bill of rights. As discussed above, the Federal-
ists feared the notion of a bill, because it might warp the Consti-
tution through the misconstruction that the federal government 
would thereby have the power to violate any rights not enumer-
ated. A bill had no use, they said, for a people who surrendered 
nothing and retained everything. Levy considers these argu-
ments "absurd" and suggests implicitly that the passage of the 
Bill entailed their abandonment. (pp. 23, 104) But the Federal-
ists said what they meant and meant what they said. They wrote 
the Ninth Amendment and put it in the Bill to safeguard against 
those very real fears. 
The preamble to the Bill quoted above also reflected this 
desire to prevent these "misconstruction[s],"20 but Madison's 
original proposal for the Ninth Amendment was much starker: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in 
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to di-
minish the just importance of other rights retained by the 
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution. (pp. 282-83) 
Madison's proposal was designed precisely to assuage the Feder-
alist fears that Levy belittles, and, as rephrased b~ the House 
Committee, it was written into the Bill of Rights.2 The state-
ment is clear. The Bill comprises "exceptions," increasing rights 
by decreasing government powers, but unenumerated rights, 
"retained the people," are still protected. Furthermore, some of 
the enumerated rights had been protected without the Bill, their 
enumeration being a mere matter of "greater caution." In other 
words, the People have enforceable rights; the power of their 
19. By contrast, the Tenth Amendment (which made clear that the powers not 
delegated to the federal government were reserved to the states a1_1d the Peo~le) was 
widely proposed by stales (p. 266), and would have made sense standmg alone, Without a 
Bill of Rights preceding it. 
20. See Famigheui, The World Almanac and Book of Facts at535 (cited in note 15). 
21. The first part of Madison's proposal became the Ninth Amendment, and the 
second was absorbed into the proposed Tenth Amendment (not covered in Origins). 
The meaning of Madison's statement was fully preserved. 
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government to take away those rights is restricted; and the Bill 
does not somehow reduce the enforceability of any rights by 
enumerating only some of them. 
Obviously, the unenumerated rights are protected in ways 
other than being enumerated as positive constitutional law. 
What ways are these? The most obvious methods are those that 
were in place before the Bill. The background of structural, 
popular-sovereignty protections-the Constitution as a Bill of 
Rights-remains to perform its functions. 22 
Levy offers a different answer in his final chapter (lifted 
from Original Intent). He argues that natural rights (in 1789) or 
"rights worthy of our respect" (in 1999) are positively guaran-
teed by the Ninth Amendment, and that courts have an equal 
duty to enforce them whether they are enumerated or unenu-
merated.23 (p. 260) Regardless of whether Levy's view is valid, 
however, he again overlooks the importance of structural protec-
tions for majoritarian rights, protections which the Framers took 
seriously and which we generally can still utilize today. 
C. AN EXAMPLE-THE SEDITION Acr 
The significance and centrality of structural means of pro-
tecting rights are revealed very starkly in the case of the Sedition 
Act of 1798.24 With the ink on the First Amendment barely dry, 
the Federalist-controlled Congress passed the Sedition Act, 
making it a crime to libel federal incumbents. Levy makes a 
strong case that, just as today free speech excludes obscenity, 
22. Admittedly, on its face the Ninth Amendment is less than explicit about how 
the retained rights were supposed to be protected. The account given above, emphasiz-
ing structural enforcement exclusively through popular sovereignty, has been denigrated. 
Sec, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in Randy 
E. Barnett, ed., 1 The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment I, 20-31 (George Mason U. Press, 1989); John Han Ely, Democracy 
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 38-44 (Harvard U. Press, 1980). But see John 
Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L.J. 967,994-99 (1993). I am 
in the process of writing an account of the Ninth Amendment that emphasizes these po-
litical means of defining and enforcing rights, and promotes their revitalization today. 
23. Federal couns have enforced unenumerated rights, to be sure, but they have not 
used the Ninth Amendment to do so. Even Justice Chase, in his famous defense of judi-
cial enforcement of natural law in Calder v. Bull, did not mention the Ninth Amendment, 
just seven years after its passage. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) 
(Chase, J.) (seriatim). 
24. This is an episode Levy knows well. Indeed, the view of the episode developed 
here and in Origins relies heavily on Levy's earlier trailblazing works, Leonard W. Levy, 
Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (Har-
vard U. Press, 1960), and Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford U. Press, 
1985). 
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fighting words, and clear and present dangers, in 1798 freedom 
of the press was broadly understood to exclude seditious libel. 
(pp. 116-17) Several people were prosecuted under the Act, and 
only one was acquitted by his jury. (p. 225) The Supreme Court 
never heard a Sedition Act case, and no subsequent Supreme 
Court case law clearly held that the Act was unconstitutional, 
until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 166 years later.25 If the 
First Amendment were nothing more than a positive-law protec-
tion to invoke in court, it would have failed an early and impor-
tant test. It would have been more like a Soviet right than an 
American one. 
But the Bill of Rights meant (and means) more than just 
fodder for a legal brief. It was a declaration of popular majori-
tarian rights that could be protected by majoritarian processes. 
In a way that has become unfamiliar in this era of judges having 
the first, last, and only word in constitutional interpretation, the 
other branches of government-the political branches-took se-
riously their roles as interpreters and protectors of constitutional 
rights. 
As mentioned above, the jury portion of this structural de-
fense system failed in every case but one. But the rest of the sys-
tem worked. Jefferson and Madison rallied public opinion, 
through the Kentucky and Virginia state legislatures (whose 
"speech" in the famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions was 
immune from sedition prosecution) to inform and mobilize pub-
lic opinion against this outrage, leaping forward to present a 
new, broader, libertarian theory of a free press in the process. 
(pp. 125-30) They and their allies also proceeded through the 
electoral process, appealing to the People to support Jefferson-
ian candidates for the House and, through their state legisla-
tures, for the Senate. The pinnacle of the strategy was to elect 
Jefferson himself President in the "Revolution of 1800." The 
new Jeffersonian majority in Congress allowed the Act to expire. 
Jefferson himself pardoned the offenders remaining in jail.26 The 
25. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,276 (1964). 
26. Jefferson's action was an unabashed act of constitutional interpretation, not just 
an act of political grace. As Jefferson himself explained it, "I discharged every person 
under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, becau~ I considered, and now 
consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as tf Congress had ordered 
us to fall down and worship a golden image." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Ad-
ams (July 22, 1804), in H.A. Washington, ed., 4 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 555, 556 
(Townsend Macloun, 1884). 
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People had spoken and, no thanks to the courts, expanded their 
First Amendment rights.27 
Levy knows this history, and tells most of it in Origins, but 
he does not connect it to the larger meaning of the Bill of Rights 
and the structural processes of popular sovereignty that both 
vindicate and exemplify it. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Flip to the back cover of Leonard Levy's Origins of the Bill 
of Rights, and you will find Professor Amar's praise for Levy's 
work: "Pulling together a lifetime of scholarship on liberty, Levy 
offers a vivid account of the various rights and freedoms that 
Americans care most deeply about." Quite true. Levy has writ-
ten a great book about the Rights. Unfortunately, he has missed 
an important part of the story of the Bill. 
The continuing importance of the structural protections dis-
cussed in this review is reflected in the strength of the Bill today. 
Although it took generations before the Bill began to be utilized 
as a positive-law source of rights, those same rights were not 
badly or irreparably abused in the meantime. It is this-protec-
tion of rights through popular sovereignty, and constitutional 
vigilance by the People and their elected proxies- that distin-
guishes our Bill from the similarly-worded but empty promises 
of the old Soviet Bill of Rights. Rights thrive in a democracy 
constructed so that the real power to protect rights is retained by 
the People who cherish them. 
27. Or they had protected their Ninth Amendment rights, to the extent that the 
Sedition Act implicated an unenumerated right beyond the scope of freedom of the 
press. 
